Constitutional Law by Robinson, David W., II
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 1 Article 10 
1966 
Constitutional Law 
David W. Robinson II 
Robinson, McFadden & Moore (Columbia, SC) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David W. Robinson II, Constitutional Law, 18 S. C. L. Rev. 21 (1966). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DAVID W. ROBINSON, II*
I. EQUAL PROTECTION
Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 the
Supreme Court decided two cases arising from Columbia, both
involving sit-in demonstrators. In Bouie -. CoZumbla, 2 the
demonstrators were convicted 3 for violating a statute which for-
bids "entry upon the lands of another... after notice from the
owner or tenant prohibiting such entry .... "4 The Supreme Court
concluded that the statute, as written, did not give the demon-
strators fair warning that their conduct, in remaining on the
premises after being asked to leave, was prohibited,5 and, there-
fore deprived the demonstrators of rights guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 In Barr v. Go-
lumbiaT the demonstrators were convicted for breach of the
peace and trespass for refusing to leave the lunch counter of a
drug store after being ordered to do so. The conviction for
criminal trespass was reversed per curiam "for the reasons stated
in Bouie v. City of Columbia."5 The court also concluded that
the convictions for breach of the peace were unsupported by
evidence, stating:
* Robinson, McFadden & Moore, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
2. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
3. City of Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-386 (1962). There was no city ordinance on the
subject or other element of state coercion such as that on which the Court
grounded its reversal in Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). See
Robinson, Constitutional Law, 17 S.C.L. REv. 13 (1965); see also Robinson v.
Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
5. "There was nothing in the statute to indicate that it also prohibited the
different act of remaining on the premises after being asked to leave."
Boule v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 355 (1964).
6. Id. at 367. In the dissenting opinion of Justices Black, Harlan and White
it was stated that the dissenting justices could not believe that the demonstrators
could have been "misled by the language of this statute (S.C. Con ANN. §
16-386 (1962)) into believing that it would permit them to stay on the property
of another over the owner's protest without being guilty of trespass." The
dissenters also felt that their dissenting opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 318 (1964), should govern this action, and the court should rule that the
fourteenth amendment does not compel a restaurant owner to accept customers
he does not desire to serve.
7. 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
8. Id. at 151. Justices Black, Harlan and White dissented from the reversal
of the trespass convictions on the same grounds set forth in their dissenting
opinions in Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) and Bell v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 226 (1964).
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[T]he only evidence to which the city refers to justify the
breach of peace convictions here, . . . is a suggestion that
petitioners' mere presence seated at the counter might pos-
sibly have tended to move onlookers to commit acts of
violence. 9
Shortly after these cases were decided, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 196410 and such discrimination in covered
establishments was prohibited. In Heart of Atlanta Motel V.
United States" the Supreme Court decided that the Civil Rights
Act was constitutional as a proper exercise of the commerce
clause.
In Hamm v. Rock Hill12 the court enunciated a novel doctrine
which disposed of the hundreds of prior convictions of sit-in
demonstrators pending on appeal. In Hamm the demonstrators
were convicted for violation of a statute which made it an of-
fense to enter a place of business after having been warned not
to do so or to refuse to leave immediately after having entered.1
3
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Clark,
ruled that the criminal prosecutions were prohibited by the
Civil Rights Act because the proprietor was attempting to dis-
criminate on racial grounds. Then the Court stated that, since
the state prosecutions were not finalized when the statute was
enacted, and because all federal prosecutions would be abated by
the Civil Rights Act, the supremacy clause required a similar
result in relation to state practices and state statutes contrary to
the act. This, the Court stated, was not a retroactive intrusion
into state criminal law, but merely an "application of a long-
standing federal rule, namely, that since the Civil Rights Act
substitutes a right for a crime any state statute . . . to the con-
trary must ... give way under the normal abatement rule cover-
ing pending convictions arising out of a pre-enactment activ-
ity."' 4 The four dissenting justices 'I pointed out that there was
9. Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 150 (1964).
10. 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
11. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
12. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-388 (1962). Bouje and Barr arose under S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-386 (1962) several months after section 16-388 was enacted to
specifically cover such demonstrations. See City of Rock Hill v. Hamm, 241
S.C. 420, 128 S.E.2d 907 (1962).
14. Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 315 (1964).
15. Mr. Justices Black, Harlan, Stewart, and White each wrote a separate
opinion.
[Vol. is
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nothing in legislative history or language of the act to indicate
any such congressional intention; the "common law" abatement
rule applied only to one statute's succeeding another; and, Con-
gress had no constitutional authority to abate prior lawful state
convictions.
II. LEGISLATiv APPORTIONMENT
There were no South Carolina cases involving apportionment
during this survey period. However, no constitutional survey
could omit what will undoubtedly be one of the most contro-
versial decisions of this decade. In Reynolds v. Sims'( the Su-
preme Court extended the doctrines of Baker v. Carr,17 Gray v.
Sanders,'8 and Wesberry v. Sanders19 and ruled that, as a basic
constitutional requirement, the equal protection clause requires
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature be
apportioned on a population basis, and that the Alabama senate
and house should be apportioned on the basis of population so
as to meet a "one-man, one-vote" rule. The Court did not under-
take to formulate any single solution, stating:
We do not consider here the difficult question of the proper
remedial devices which federal courts should utilize in state
legislative apportionment cases.... It is enough to say now
that once a State's legislative apportionment scheme has
been found unconstitutional, it would be the unusual case
in which a court would be justified in not taking appropri-
ate adtion to insure that no further elections are conducted
under the invalid plan.
2 0
The Court recognized that a variety of plans could meet the
requirement, including multi- or single-member districts, or even
overlapping districts.
2 '
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (8-to-i, 2 concurring).
17. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
18. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
19. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964).
21. On that same day the Court extended this requirement to apportionment
plans arising from Colorado, Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of Colorado, 377
U.S. 713 (1964); Delaware, Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Mary-
land, Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Lawes, 377 U.S. 656
(1964); New York, WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Oklahoma,
Williams v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau, 378 U.S. 558 (1964); Virginia, Davis v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); and Washington, Myers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 54
(1964).
1966]
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III. DiATn PENALTY
In Moorer v. MacDougaZ22 a convicted rapist 23 sought to have
his conviction set aside in a habeas corpus proceeding on the
ground that the imposition of the death penalty violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. One of
Moorer's arguments was that in South Carolina the death penalty
had been almost exclusively reserved for Negroes in such cases,
thus constituting a racially discriminatory application of the
law. The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the motives
or circumstances which might have prompted the jury to impose
the death penalty in a given case, "cannot be inquired into or
proven because of the inviolability of the jury room .... -24
The court also stated that statistics showing that the death
sentence had been imposed in more cases involving Negroes than
whites did not show racial discrimination, but only that the
variation depended on the circumstances, aggravation, and enorm-
ity of the crime in each case.
25
IV. ErzoTiows
In the 1964 elections for the ten vacancies in Richland County's
delegation to the state legislature, the Republican party nomi-
nated only four candidates and sought to avoid the necessity of
voting for six democratic candidates or of writing in six names
in order for their votes to be counted. In Boineau v. Thornto?0
6
a three-judge federal court concluded that the requirement that
an elector vote for as many candidates as there were vacancies
in order for his vote to be counted 27 does not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The argument
was raised that the practice of requiring a filled-in ballot would
result in a dilution of the weight of the votes for the Republican
nominees. The court stated that such dilution could be avoided
if the Republican party either nominated a full slate of candi-
dates or used the write-in device.28 The court recognized that
22. 245 S.C. 633, 142 S.E.2d 46 (1965).
23. State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 129 S.E.2d 330 (1963).
24. Moorer v. MacDougall, 245 S.C. 633, 638, 142 S.E.2d 46, 50 (1965).
25. Ibid. The issue has not ended. Recently, the United States Court of
Appeals, Fourth Circuit, directed the district court to give Moorer a hearing
on his federal habeas corpus appeal, Moorer v. South Carolina, 347 F.2d 502
(4th Cir. 1965).
26. 235 F. Supp. 175 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
27. See S.C. ConE ANN. § 23-357 (1962).
28. Boineau v. Thornton, 235 F. Supp. 175, 178 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
[Vol. 18
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the type of dilution prohibited by Reynolds V. Sims 2 9 was based
on disparity of population in different voting districts and that
the statute requiring a fully filled-in ballot "avoids rather
than fosters possibilities of dilution of the weight of votes...,,8o
if each party nominates a full slate of candidates.
V. SELF-INCRMINATION
The United States Supreme Court continued its disposition to
broaden the scope of the fourteenth amendment. In what may
be termed a "predictable" decision, the Court held that the
fourteenth amendment incorporated the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.3 1 Petitioner was called as a wit-
ness in a state crimes inquiry and, invoking the self-incrimination
privilege, refused to answer a number of questions. The Su-
preme Court reversed his contempt conviction, stating that not
only is the self-incrimination privilege applicable to the states,
but also its application is governed by federal standards.3
2
VI. DuE PRocEss
A. Right to Counsel
Pitt v. MacDougaZl3  involved a retrospective application of
the rule, announced in Gideon v. Wainwright,34 that an indigent
defendant must be offered a court-appointed counsel. The South
Carolina Supreme Court stated that a waiver of this right is
effective only if intelligently and understandingly given. The
defendant's failure to specifically request counsel will not con-
stitute such a waiver.
On the question of adequacy of representation, Tillman v.
State3 5 held that due process was not denied when the de-
fendant's paid counsel agreed to represent the defendant only
in the event that he decided, of his own free will, to plead guilty.
29. 377 U.S: 533 (1964).
30. Boineau v. Thornton, 235 F. Supp. 175, 180 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
31. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1965).
32. This decision overruled Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) and
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). For a summary of other recent
Supreme Court decisions relating to the incorporation of the first eight amend-
ments into the fourteenth amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n2
(1965).
33. 245 S.C. 98, 138 S.E.2d 840 (1964).
34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35. 244 S.C. 259, 136 S.E.2d 300 (1964).
1966]
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The court stated that counsel had done nothing to coerce the
defendant into pleading guilty. Rather, counsel told him that
the decision was his to make and if he did not wish to plead
guilty, he could retain other counsel or the court would appoint
counsel for him.36 The court found no condition imposed which
either deprived the defendant of adequate representation, or in
any way coerced him into pleading guilty. He was given full
opportunity to select other counsel or have counsel appointed.
B. Milk Regulation
In Stone V. iSalley37 the South Carolina Supreme Court was
again faced with the issue of whether the legislature had the au-
thority to regulate milk prices. The state dairy commission is-
sued an order fixing the minimum price of milk and prohibiting
producers, distributors and retailers from selling such milk be-
low the cost of production. In its decision, the court affirmed
and elaborated on its prior ruling in Gwynette v. Myers.38 On
both occasions the court has stated that "the business of selling
milk was not affected with the public interest; "39 that "regula-
tion of milk prices was beyond state's police power;" and that
the "statute which purports to give State Dairy Commission
power to regulate retail price was to that extent unconstitution-
al." 40 The court made its position emphatic:
The state may not dictate prices in a private industry merely
because the industry is large and important or because the
public may be concerned in respect of its maintenanice, but
such control is justifiable under the police power only when
the industry is affected with a public interest in a sense
that it may fairly be said that it has been devoted to the
public use.
4 '
Since the case at hand was almost identical to Gwynette, the court
again held that so much of the act as attempted to fix the retail
price of milk, violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the constitution.
36. Tillman v. State, 244 S.C. 259, 263, 136 S.E.2d 300, 303-04 (1964).
37. 244 S.C. 531, 137 S.E.2d 788 (1964).
38. 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E.2d 673 (1960).
39. The court reached this conclusion in spite of a contrary statement in the
Act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1635 (1962).
40. Stone v. Salley, 244 S.C. 531, 540, 137 S.E.2d 788, 791 (1964).
41. Id. at 539, 137 S.E.2d at 791-92.
[Vol. 18
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C. Taxation
The constitutionality of the mileage formula4 2 was questioned
in Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v. South, Carolina Tax Comm'n.
4
3
The appellant trucking company derived only one percent of
its net income from freight pick ups and deliveries in South
Carolina but it was taxed on seventeen percent of its income be-
cause that was the proportion of its mileage travelled in South
Carolina. Appellant contended that a tax so based, in light of
the result which placed its tax well above its income in this state,
produced arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional results
in violation of the federal and state constitutions.44 In upholding
the validity of the mileage formula, the court stated the seven-
teen percent of the appellant's total mileage, travelled in this
state, was contributing to the appellant's income. The court
pointed out that the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the
tax, when applied to it, produces an arbitrary or unconstitu-
tional result. In this case the appellant did not meet this
burden.
4 5
VII. Fn O oF RELiGION
In 1962 the legislature revised the Sunday closing law so as to
specifically prohibit the sale of certain articles on Sunday and
exempt other business operations.4" In State 'V. Solomon4 7 the
defendant appealed his conviction under this law, contending
that it violated provisions of the first amendment to the federal
constitution and the state constitution, concerning the free exer-
cise of religion. Since the statute set aside Sunday for the fur-
therance of religious beliefs, it discriminated against members
of non-Christian sects, who did not hold Sunday as a day of
worship. The court sustained the validity of the statute on the
ground that its aim was to provide a uniform day of rest, and
thus, it served a secular, not religious, purpose. The court noted
that the legislature had found that changing social and economic
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-256 (1962). By this formula, the income tax on ap-
pellants' foreign corporation is based on the proportionate mileage travelled by
its trucks in South Carolina, to that travelled totally by it.
43. 244 S.C. 134, 135 S.E2d 756 (1964).
44. U.S. CoNsT. art I. § 9 (commerce clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
S.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 5 (1895).
45. Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 244 S.C.
134, 141, 135 S.E2d 756, 762 (1964).
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 64-210 to -216 (1962).
47. 245 S.C. 550, 141 S.E2d 818 (1965).
1966]
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factors created a need for a more equitable and uniform method
of observing a day of rest in this state and that such legislation
was in the interest of moral, physical and mental health of the
public.
V-II. FIFTH AmmND MNT
In LeaveZl v. United States"8 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of South Carolina held that the noise
and vibration of jet airplanes on federal property was not an
actual invasion of the plaintiff's property, and thus, did not
constitute a taking without just compensation in violation of the
fifth amendment. The court relied on the principles enunciated
in Batten v. United States40 and similar cases. In construing
this constitutional provision the federal courts have consistently
distinguished between a taking and consequential damages.
"Governmental activities which do not directly encroach on
private property are not a taking within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment even though the consequences of such acts
may impair the use of the property."50 In other words the plain-
tiff must show an actual invasion of his property in order to
recover ;rI a showing of damages alone is not sufficient to require
compensation. In Leavell recovery was sought solely for damages
from noise, shock and vibration. Thus, the court denied recovery
because no actual invasion took place. Further, the court ob-
served that while there was some interference with the plaintiff's
enjoyment of the property, the government's actions were not so
complete as to deprive the owner of all her interest in the subject
matter and thus was not a "taking" in the constitutional sense.
IX. COUNTY GovERNmENT
In 1964, legislation was enacted which authorized Anderson
County to borrow 225,000 dollars from the state sinking fund
for the construction of a water line. In order to secure repay-
ment of that sum the full faith, credit and taxing power of
Anderson County was pledged.52 This act further provided that
48. 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
49. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
50. Batton v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1962).
51. An example of actual invasion is the case where the plaintiff's property
is damaged by government airplanes crossing over his land. See Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946).
52. S.C. Acrs & J. Rls. 1964, p. 2550.
[Vol. 18
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the county was directed to levy and collect an annual tax on all
the taxable property in the county; this tax was to be sufficient
to retire the loan and interest due thereon. The validity of this
act was attacked in Bratcher V. Ashley 53 where the plaintiffs
contended that the act violated the state constitution, which
provides:
The General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize
any county or township to levy a tax or issue bonds for any
purpose except for educational purposes, to build and repair
roads, buildings and bridges, to maintain and support pris-
oners, pay jurors, county officers, and for litigation, quaran-
tine and court expense and for ordinary county purposes, to
support paupers, and pay past indebtedness.54
County taxes may not be levied or county bonds issued for an
undertaking which does not come within this provision no matter
how public the purpose.55 In holding the act unconstitutional, the
court stated that the construction and maintenance of a water
line was not an "ordinary county purpose", and thus, was not
authorized by the state constitution.
53. 245 S.C. 421, 141 S.E2d 109 (1965).
54. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 (1895).
55. See, e.g., Leonard v. Talbert, 225 S.C. 559, 83 S.E.2d 201 (1954); Ben-
jamine v. Housing Authority, 198 S.C. 79, 15 S.E.2d 737 (1941); Gentry v.
Taylor, 192 S.C. 145, 5 S.E.2d 857 (1939).
1966]
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